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Ali so imeli Kartažani možnost poslati Hanibala na Sicilijo?

Ali so imeli Kartažani možnost poslati Hanibala na Sicilijo?

Sicilija je bila glavni fokus prve in druge punske vojne. Prva punska vojna se je končala s tem, ko je Kartagina predala glavna območja pridelave žita na otoku, pristanišče Lilybaem pa Rimu kot vojni plen.

Druga punska vojna se je začela kot vstaja Hanibala, potomca enega od rojenih generalov v Kartagini, v Španiji proti "plazeči" rimski prevladi. Z malo kartagijske podpore (vendar implicitno odobritvijo vlade) je zbral "mešano" vojsko, prečkal Alpe in napadel Italijo. Ker je bila obramba Rima zanj premočna, se je končal na južnem delu polotoka in se boril proti vojni z klackalico.

Med drugo punsko vojno je Kartagina poslala približno 77.000 mož, da bi poskušali ponovno ujeti Sicilijo, več kot jih je imel kdaj Hanibal. Morda bi raje okrepili Hannibala z njimi.

Morda pa bi Kartažani lahko storili še bolje, če bi Hanibala napotili na Sicilijo, da bi prejel te okrepitve, ponovno zavzel Lilibaem in žitna zemljišča ter preprečil, da bi Sirakuza padla v rimske roke. Ali pa so mornariški ali drugi pomisleki to izključili?


Kartagino vodstvo ni v celoti zaostalo za Hanibalovo vojno proti Rimu. To so sicer poskušali izkoristiti (na primer neuspešno misijo na Siciliji), vendar nikoli niso dali svoje moči za Hanibala. Ko so spoznali, da bi morali, je bilo že prepozno. Okrepitve, oblegalno orožje in mornarica bi Hanibalu veliko pomagali. Nobena od teh stvari ni prišla iz Kartagine.

Edino, kar bi Hanibalu lahko pomagalo, je bil, da je zavzel Rim. Brez mornarice, oblegalnega orožja in veliko več moških je bilo to nemogoče. In tudi z vzetim Rimom je malo verjetno, da bi Rimljani obupali ...


Zakaj je Hanibal izgubljen

Z edino taktično zmago je Hanibal leta 218 pred našim štetjem pogumno prečkal zasnežene Alpe in napadel rimsko središče.

Med osnovnimi razlikami v vojskovanju je razlika med taktiko in strategijo. Izraz taktika se nanaša na operativne tehnike, ki jih vojaške enote uporabljajo za zmago v bitkah. Po drugi strani pa strategija obravnava širše politične cilje, za katere se vodi vojna, in cilje, načine in sredstva za njihovo dosego. Za uspeh strategije mora obstajati vsaj groba povezava med taktičnimi cilji in širšimi cilji, za katere se vodi vojna. V nasprotnem primeru bitke postanejo same sebi, pogosto s hudimi strateškimi posledicami.

Tako je bilo pri Hannibalu Barci, kartažanskem generalu, ki je veljal za enega najbolj sposobnih in nadarjenih poveljnikov v zgodovini. V rimsko Italijo je vdrl v tistem, kar zgodovinarji še vedno štejejo za klasično kampanjo, osvojil je vse svoje večje angažmaje in kljub temu na koncu ni dosegel nobenega od strateških ciljev Kartagine.

Po njegovem mnenju so se vojske borile, dokler političnemu vodstvu poražene strani ni postalo jasno, da se z nadaljnjim bojem ne da nič več pridobiti.

Hannibal, rojen leta 247 pr. njegova smrt tam v bitki leta 228 pr. Hannibal je v bistvu odraščal v vojaški službi in po atentatu na svojega svaka Hasdrubala, ki je zamenjal Hamilcarja, leta 221 pr.n.št., je Hanibal prevzel vodenje kartažanske vojske. Kmalu se je izkazal za briljantnega poveljnika na terenu, ki je svoj razum in borilne sposobnosti uporabil za edinstven konec zmagovalnih bitk.

Spet pa so bitke sredstvo za strateški cilj in ne same sebi. Hanibal, zapriseženi sovražnik vsega rimskega, je to dejstvo izgubil ob pogledu na drugo punsko vojno (218–201 pr. N. Št.). Medtem ko bi konflikt divjal po vsem Sredozemlju, je bil Hanibalov edini cilj zmaga v Italiji. Da bi to dosegel, je večji del svoje vojske prehodil v Iberiji čez južno Galijo (današnja Francija) in slavno čez Alpe v rimsko središče.

Hannibal se svojih operacij v Italiji ni lotil kot ene kampanje v večji vojni, ampak kot samo kampanjo v samo vojno. Zdelo se mu je, da verjame, da bo zmagal v Italiji, če bo dobil dovolj bitk, in če bo zmagal v Italiji, bo njegova. Na koncu pa je zaradi zmede taktike s strategijo prišlo do številnih operativnih napak, ki so privedle do njegovega poraza v Italiji. In njegova izguba je imela hude posledice za Kartagino.

Vojne se razvijajo v kulturnem kontekstu, ki ga nasprotniki prinašajo v konflikt. Za Rimljane je bila vojna preprosta plenilska vaja, ki je bila uporabljena za uničenje sovražnikovega režima. Bitke so bile sredstvo za večje politične cilje osvajanja, okupacije in gospodarskega izkoriščanja. Če bi sprejel poraz, za katerega obstaja nevarnost, da bo sovražnik takšne pogoje naložil lastnim državljanom, bi Rim plačal kakršno koli ceno krvi in ​​zaklada, da bi to preprečil. Rimljani so se borili do odločilne zmage. Šele nato so sledila pogajanja.

Hannibalov pogled na vojno je temeljil na vplivu helenistične kulture. Po njegovem mnenju cilj ni bil uničenje sovražnikovega državnega ali političnega režima. Namesto tega so se vojske borile med seboj, dokler političnemu vodstvu poražene strani ni postalo jasno, da se z nadaljnjim bojem ne da nič več pridobiti in morda veliko izgubiti. Antagonisti so nato začeli pogajanja in dosegli rešitev komercialne ali geografske narave. Hannibal je verjel, da bodo njegove zmage na bojišču prisilile Rim na pogajalsko mizo. Ta helenistični pristop je preprečil Hanibalu, da bi napadel sam Rim, ko mu je predstavil dve priložnosti - najprej po zmagi leta 217 pred našim štetjem pri jezeru Trasimene in spet po Cannaeju nekaj več kot eno leto kasneje. Po Hanibalovih mislih je bil napad na Rim nepotreben za končni izid vojne.

Ko so Rimljani po katastrofi v Cannae zavrnili razpravo o miru, se je Hanibalov načrt začel razkrivati. Ena stvar je bila pričakovati, da se bodo Galci pridružili njegovi kampanji proti Rimu, vendar je bila predpostavka, da se bodo rimski latinski zavezniki ali rimske kolonije pridružile v znatnem številu, popolnoma neutemeljena, saj temelji na nerazumevanju rimske kulture in zgodovine. Če Hannibalu to prej ni bilo jasno, je gotovo bilo po Canni. Kot rezervni si je prizadeval ustvariti konfederacijo italijanskih in grških držav, ki bi po končani vojni dejansko postale protektorati Kartagine.

Da bi imel Hanibalov načrt kakršne koli možnosti za uspeh, je bilo potrebno dovolj delovne sile za dosego dveh stvari: Prvič, držati mesta in varovati kmetijske vire, ki so potrebni za prehrano okupatorskih čet, nato pa vzdrževati veliko terensko vojsko, ki se bo spopadla z vsemi rimskimi napadi. Težava je bila v tem, da je potreboval veliko več delovne sile, kot jo je imel, ali pa bi jo lahko zbral in oskrbel samo v Italiji.

Hannibalov revidiran načrt je bil torej odvisen od Kartagine, da je zagotovila delovne sile in logistične zahteve zunaj Italije, česar pa zaradi dobrih strateških razlogov ni hotela storiti. Poleg tega načrt ni upošteval sposobnosti rimske mornarice, da blokira južna italijanska pristanišča in moti oskrbovalne konvoje iz Kartagine. Najpomembneje je, da je bila Hanibalova južnoitalijanska konfederacija v bistvu obrambna strategija, ki je pustila nedotaknjeno in izpodbijala rimsko delovno silo in bazo virov severno od reke Volturn (Volturno), s čimer je Rimu omogočila obnovo vojske, dokler ni bila pripravljena nadaljevati ofenzive. Tudi če se je združil, Hanibalova zveza uporniških mest v južni Italiji ni mogla dovolj ovirati vojnih prizadevanj Rima, da bi ga spodbudila k iskanju miru.

Hanibalov neuspeh v napadu na Rim je bila njegova največja taktična napaka. Rimski zgodovinar Livy nam pove, da se je Kartagina leta 203 pred našim štetjem spomnila na Hanibala, da je preklical »prekletstva na svojo glavo, ker ni vodil svojih vojsk naravnost v Rim, ko so bile še krvave s zmagovitega polja Cannae«. Toda zgodovina mora gledati Hanibalov neuspeh v napadu na Rim v kontekstu njegovega večjega nerazumevanja strategije, ki je vodila vodenje vojne.

Tako Kartagina kot Rim sta vojno gledala v precej širšem strateškem kontekstu kot Hanibal. Rim si je prizadeval ohraniti dobičke, ki jih je pridobil med prvo punsko vojno, in morda zavzeti Iberijo, Kartagina pa je želela obdržati Iberijo in obnoviti ozemlje na Korziki, Sardiniji in Siciliji, ki ga je izgubila v prejšnji vojni. Rim je jasno zaznal strateški namen Kartagine: od 11 legij, razporejenih po prihodu Hanibala v Italijo, sta bili dve poslani v Iberijo, dve na Sardinijo, dve na Sicilijo in ena v pristanišče Tarentum (današnji Taranto), da bi preprečili Filipovo invazijo. V Makedoniji, čeprav se je moral še povezati z Hanibalom. Samo štiri legije so bile razporejene v Italiji, da bi se spopadle z Hanibalovo invazijo.

Če bi Hanibal pogledal tudi širše, bi razumel, da bi bil napad na Rim taktičen in strateški smisel. Pohod na prestolnico po njegovi zmagi pri Trasimenu bi prisilil Rimljane, da bi mu priskočili na pomoč, pri čemer so svoje sile izvlekli izven Italije. Do takrat je le ena nepoškodovana legija v Tarentumu ostala za obrambo Rima. Pri Trasimenu je Hanibal uničil vojsko Gaja Flaminija, njegov podrejeni Maharbal pa je uničil konjenico Gnaja Servilija Gemina. Dve najbližji rimski legiji sta bili na Sardiniji, vendar je 70 kartuganskih vojnih ladij patruljiralo v njenih vodah, da bi preprečilo prevoz rimskih čet na celino.

Če bi Hanibal nemudoma stopil na prestolnico, bi bil Rim celo kot finta prisiljen odpoklicati nekatere svoje legije, s katerimi bi Sicilijo, Sardinijo ali Iberijo izpostavili kartaginjskemu napadu in invaziji. Njegovo neukrepanje je pomenilo izgubljeno priložnost, čeprav se je za nazaj zavedel, da bi vojna lahko obrnila tok.

Ob izbruhu vojne je Kartagina Hanibalu sprva dala proste roke, saj ni imela druge izbire, kot da podpre svojega terenskega poveljnika pri njegovi strategiji, usmerjeni v Italo. Toda po Cannaeju, ko je postalo jasno, da Rima ne morejo prisiliti za pogajalsko mizo, je Kartagina zagovarjala bolj neposreden pristop k povrnitvi izgubljenih posesti.

Kartaga si je od vojne najbolj želela obdržati Iberijo s svojimi donosnimi rudniki srebra, trgovskimi bazami in monopolom v notranji trgovini. Želela si je tudi povrniti svoje baze na Korziki, Sardiniji, Siciliji in nekaterih otokih na morju ter tako nadzorovati morske poti v vzhodnem Sredozemlju. Po Kani se je Kartagina preselila, da bi zavarovala te posesti, tako da jih je okrepila, tako kot v Iberiji, ali jih poskušala vojaško zavzeti - kot na Sardiniji, Siciliji in Korziki. Če bi lahko Kartagina v svojih nekdanjih posestih vzpostavila pomembno vojaško prisotnost, bi jih imela po tem, ko se je vojna končala in ko so prišla pogajanja, v močni poziciji, da jih obdrži.

Hannibalovi nadrejeni so njegove operacije v Italiji videli le kot lokalno kampanjo, namenjeno povezovanju čim večjega števila rimskih legij, hkrati pa so izvajali vojaški pritisk na pomembnejša strateška območja. Pametno je revidirala svoj strateški pristop in cilje - neposredno posledico Hannibalovega neuspeha pri uresničevanju kratkovidnih ciljev v Italiji.

Hannibal se je po Karni počutil, da ga je Kartaga izdala. Ko so njegovi nadrejeni leta 203 pred našim štetjem ukazali svojemu poveljniku, naj opusti italijansko kampanjo in se vrne v Afriko, je Livy zapisal, da je Hanibal "škrtal z zobmi, stokal in skoraj solzil". Odkrito je krivil Kartagino, ker ni podpirala njegove kampanje z vojaki, zalogami in denarjem. "Moški, ki so me poskušali povleči nazaj, tako da so mi odrezali zaloge moških in denarja, me zdaj odpokličejo," se je pritožil in dodal, da njegov poraz ni prišel v roke Rimljanov, ampak kartažinskega senata in zavist. "

Tako kot pri mnogih velikih poveljnikih zgodovine na terenu je tudi Hanibal vsaj deloma podlegel vrhunski logistiki svojega sovražnika.

Hanibalova obtožba, da mu karteganski senat ni poslal kritične oskrbe in vojakov, ko je bilo najbolj potrebno, je bila mrtva. Med drugo punsko vojno je Kartagina poslala Hanibalu samo eno odpravo za oskrbo - marginalno silo 4000 numidijskih konjev, 40 slonov in nekaj denarja leta 215 pr. Po tem ni prejel ničesar, saj je Kartagina preusmerila svoje vire v strategijo, v kateri zmaga v Italiji ni več zasedla osrednjega mesta.

Kartagino pomanjkljivo oskrbo z Hanibalom ni mogoče kriviti zaradi pomanjkanja razpoložljivih virov. Dejansko je bila kadrovska in kadrovska baza kartaškega cesarstva večja od rimskega. Odprave čete in oskrbe, ki jih je Kartagina poslala v podporo vojaškim operacijam med drugo punsko vojno, so bile znatne, v nekaterih primerih večje od celotne Hanibalove vojske v Italiji. Leta 215 pr. Kasneje istega leta je na Sardinijo poslal še večjo silo. Leta 213 pr.

Kartagina je na Sicilijo poslala 25.000 pehote, 3.000 konjenikov in 12 slonov. Leta 207 pred našim štetjem je v Iberijo poslal 10.000 dodatnih vojakov, ki so nadomestili izgube iz bitke pri Baeculi. Končno je leta 205 pred našim štetjem Hanibalov brat Mago in sila 12.000 pehote, 2.000 konjenikov in več slonov napadel Ligurijo v severni Italiji.

Kartagina se je lahko oskrbela in okrepila svojo vojsko na različnih gledališčih operacij zaradi svoje pripravljene dobave transportnih ladij-kar ni presenetljivo za komercialno in ladjedelniško državo, ki bi lahko zgradila ali najela od trgovcev toliko prevozov, kolikor je potrebno za kakršne koli nepredvidene razmere. Poleg tega navzočnost rimske mornarice v južni Italiji nikoli ni zadostovala za pokrivanje vseh baz hkrati, zato ni bilo nobenega dobrega razloga, zakaj transport oskrbe ne bi mogel priti do Hanibala.

Kartagina je imela do konca vojne več kot dovolj ljudi, materiala in transporta za podporo Hanibalu v Italiji. Preprosto se je odločil, da jih ne bo poslal.

Ironično, strateški premik Kartagine iz Italije po Cannae je prišel v času, ko je bil Hanibalov zagon na vrhuncu. Paradoksalno je, da so prav njegovi uspehi na tem področju pripeljali do ponovne preučitve strategije. Ko se je Mago leta 215 pred našim štetjem vrnil v Kartagino in zahteval vojake in zaloge za Hanibala, je nagovoril senat. Na tem sestanku je Hanno, vodja frakcije, ki je vojni nasprotovala že od vsega začetka, postavil naslednja vprašanja: »Prvič, kljub dejstvu, da je bila rimska sila popolnoma uničena v Cannaeju, in zavedanju, da je celotna Italija je v uporu, je prišel k nam kakšen član latinske konfederacije? Drugič, ali je kdo od pet in 30 rimskih plemen zapustil Hanibala? " Mago je moral odgovoriti, da niso.

"Ali so Rimljani poslali Hanibala kakšnega odposlanca za zdravljenje za mir?" Hanno je nadaljeval. "Ali je po vaših podatkih v Rimu sploh kdaj vdihnila beseda" mir "?" Mago je spet odgovoril nikalno. "Potem zelo dobro," je zaključil Hanno. "Pri vodenju vojne nismo napredovali niti za centimeter: položaj je popolnoma enak tistemu, ko je Hannibal prvič prestopil Italijo." Hanno je želel povedati, da je Hannibalova strategija, da bi Rim pripeljal za pogajalsko mizo, tako da je premagal svoje vojske na terenu, imela že ni uspelo. Če do tega trenutka ne bi dezertiral noben latinski zaveznik ali rimsko pleme, bi bilo malo verjetno, da bi kakšen nadaljnji prebeg na jugu Italije ali dodatne zmage, ki bi jih tam lahko dosegel Hanibal, spodbudile Rim k iskanju miru.

Strateška podlaga se je premaknila pod njegove noge, kar je poveljnika, ki je nekoč vladal na bojišču, zmanjšalo na le nekaj več kot žrtvovan kmet

Če Hanibal ni mogel uničiti Rima na svojih tleh, kot je verjel Kartagina, kaj potem je bil bistvo vojne? Kartaginski državniki so se po pravi helenistično odločili, da so njihove prednostne naloge ohraniti nadzor nad Iberijo in morda ponovno pridobiti Sardinijo, Korziko in druga območja, izgubljena prej. Če je bil to strateški cilj vojne, kako je potem Hanibalova stalna prisotnost v Italiji prispevala k temu cilju? Odgovor je bil, da se v Italiji poveže čim več legij, medtem ko je Kartagina svoja prizadevanja usmerila v druga gledališča operacij. Italija je postala stranska predstava, Hanibal pa je bil prepuščen svoji usodi, tako da bi se lahko po koncu vojne Kartagina držala tega, kar je osvojila drugje.

Na koncu Hannibal ni uspel v Italiji ne zato, ker je bil poražen na bojišču, ampak ker njegove taktične zmage niso prispevale k splošnim strateškim ciljem Kartagine. Po Cannaeju so se strateška tla premaknila pod Hanibalove noge in poveljnika, ki je nekoč vladal na bojišču, zmanjšala na malo več kot žrtvovalnega pešca v veliko večji igri, ki je v resnici nikoli ni razumel. MZ


Odpravil se je na Rim, da bi prisilil vpoklic rimske vojske. Odvzel je 15.000 rimskih vojakov, vendar se je obleganje nadaljevalo in Capua je padla. Leta 212 pred našim štetjem je Marcellus osvojil Sirakuze, Rimljani pa so v letih 211–210 pr.

Najbolj očitna pot, po kateri je Hannibal šel skozi Alpe, se imenuje Col du Clapier, v antiki znan kot Herkulova pot, zgodovinarka in arheologinja Eve MacDonald, predavateljica stare zgodovine na univerzi Cardiff v Združenem kraljestvu, je povedala za Live Science.


Kartagina svojo pozornost namenja Španiji

Hamilcar je spoznal, da je izguba Sicilije in otokov v Tirenskem morju pomenila propad Kartagine, razen če bi Kartagina lahko našla in izkoristila kakšen drug vir bogastva. Pogledal je v Španijo.

V naslednjih petih ali šestih letih je Hamilcar zmagal v mnogih bitkah in skoraj ves Iberski polotok pripeljal pod punski nadzor. Hannibal je zrastel v postavo in modrost, učil se je vojaškega obrta od začetka v očetovih taboriščih. Nova Kartagina (Cartagena) in Barcino mesto (Barcelona) sta z rastjo in razcvetom nove kolonije postali dve največji trgovski središči v Sredozemlju. Nato je Hamilcar padel v bitki leta 230 pred našim štetjem in poveljstvo vojske prepustil svojemu zetu Hasdrubalu. Hannibal je bil star komaj 16 let.

Kartaginska vojska se je postopoma povečevala, ko se je vse več domačih rojakov združevalo v punski standard. Do Hasdrubalove smrti z atentatom leta 221 pr.


Alternativna zgodovina – Hannibal Barca Zmaga nad Rimom

Hannibal Barca je bil zlahka eden najbolj nadarjenih taktikov v starodavnem svetu. Rimljanom je dal dobro peščico poraznih porazov. Imel je le en večji poraz na bojišču proti Scipionu v bitki pri Zami. Ta ena izguba je na koncu končala vojno.

Ostri mirovni pogoji so tako omejili moč Kartagine, da so Rimljani generacijo pozneje lahko preprosto pripluli in uničili veliko mesto enkrat za vselej. Kaj pa, če bi Hannibal zmagal še enkrat z zmago pri Zami? Kako bi potekal potek druge ali prihodnje vojne?

Tako kot pri večini ‘ Kaj če, ’ bi lahko tudi Hanibalovo zmago dokončali. Celotna rimska vojska pri Zami je v bojih ubila ali ujela, Scipiona pa mrtva. Najpomembneje si je zapomniti, da je Rim v bitki pri Zami v vojni zagotovo zmagal.

Rim je napadel in prevzel skoraj vsak del Španije v lasti Kartažanov. To je Kartažane odvzelo ogromno bogastva iz španskih rudnikov in horde več kot sposobnih španskih plačancev.

Otok Sardinijo so Rimljani pretirano držali, vendar so ga med katastrofalnim poskusom karteganske invazije med vojno dobro branili. Večina ali res vsa Sicilija je bila tudi do takrat osvojila Rim. Mogočna trdnjava Sirakuze je kljubovala Rimu, a je sčasoma padla v napad. V Afriki so celo izgubili nekaj velikih bitk in izgubili zvestobo svojega numidijskega zaveznika Syphaxa, preden je Hannibal sploh prišel na prizorišče.

Hanibal je Italijo teroriziral že več kot desetletje, vendar se je njegovo območje oblasti postopoma skrčilo do te mere, da je imel pred odhodom v Zamo le zahodni bruttij, "prst" Italije.

Tudi zmagovita bi bila absurdna strategija ponovnega napada na Italijo. Italijanska mesta, ki so se obrnila k Hanibalu, so se vrnila ali pa so jih brutalno kaznovale rimske vojske. Druga, zvesta mesta so stala z Rimom, ko se je vse gotovo zdelo izgubljeno, tako da nova invazija ne bi omajala njihove zvestobe.

Odločilni trenutek med bitko pri Zami. Strašen udarec je bil tisti, ki si ga Kartagina ne bo nikoli opomogla.

V bistvu je bila sama strategija, s katero je poskušal Hanibal (z vdorom) obrniti ohlapno povezana mesta Italije proti Rimu. Ko je odšel, je bila ta strategija odigrana in ni imela možnosti delati z drugim poskusom.

Hanibal je vdrl skozi Italijo, a so se Rimljani na koncu odločili za obrambne, a zožujoče strategije, ki so omejevale Hanibalovo učinkovitost. Frank Martini – CC BY-SA 3.0.

Kaj bi torej naredili Kartažani? Odgovor je precej dolgočasen, vendar bi verjetno tožili za mir čim prej. Že prej so iskali mir s Scipionom, a so ga prekinili, ko so izvedeli, da bo Hannibal kmalu v Afriki.

Edina pomembna vojska, ki jo je imela Kartagina, je bila Hanibalova veteranska vojska. Če bi zmagali pri Zami, bi Kartagina preprosto izkoristila zmago in dejstvo, da je Hanibal zdaj branil Afriko, da bi se pogajal o boljšem mirovnem sporazumu.

Kaj bi storili Rimljani? Spet bi bilo to verjetno tako dolgočasno. Strategija napada na Afriko je bila med elito v Rimu zelo nepriljubljena. Fabius, general, odgovoren za obrambno fabijsko strategijo, ki je na koncu Hanibala obkrožila z Bruttijem, je iskal konec vojne.

Najbolj agresivna voditelja Rima med vojno sta bila Scipio in Marcellus. Marcellus se je proti Hannibalu boril z nekaj zastoji v Italiji, kar je bil precej podvig, vendar so ga na koncu ujeli v zasedo in ga ubili. Scipion je umrl v Zami. To je služilo kot mračen opomnik na možno usodo vsakogar, ki bi hotel vdreti v Afriko.

Kaj bi se zgodilo, če ne bi dosegli miru? Rimljani bi še vedno imeli skoraj zagotovljeno zmago. Kartažani so bili vedno pomorska sila, med drugo punsko vojno pa ne. Rimljani so imeli pomorsko premoč od samega začetka vojne, zato je Hanibal ubral svojo alpsko pot.

Zemljevid vseh znanih bitk šele druge vojne. Sprva nekoliko premočno, kaže, kako sta bili obe strani v času, ko sta se borila proti Zami, izčrpani. Zmagali ali izgubili za Rimljane bi verjetno sledil mir. Maglorbd – CC BY-SA 3.0.

Ko je izbruhnila vojna, so Rimljani osvojili več pomorskih zmag in brez težav so napadli ob obalah Španije in Afrike. Če bi se vojna nadaljevala, bi Rimljani preprosto vtaknili Kartažane. Prav tako bi finančno podprli svojega numidijskega zaveznika Massinisso, ob predpostavki, da je preživel pri Zami. V nasprotnem primeru je lahko Numidia vojno območje.

Edina prava Hannibalova možnost bi bila ponovna okupacija Španije. To ni nerazumno, vendar bi Kartagino pustili v veliki meri nebranjeno in gospodarsko ohromljeno zaradi blokad in napadov. Hanibal bi moral ponovno zavzeti Numidijo proti zahodu in zdrsniti rimskim flotam, ki patruljirajo med Španijo in Afriko. Priložnost, vendar mogoča z omejenimi starodavnimi pomorskimi zmogljivostmi.

V Španiji bi imel Hannibal le borbeno priložnost in zelo verjetno leta kampanj samo zato, da bi si povrnil karteganski posest. Tudi brez tega, da bi Rim poslal vojske, ki bi mu tja nasprotovale. Rim je imel veliko lažje poslati vojake v Španijo kot oni, ki so sprožili afriško invazijo. Kartagina bi morda lahko pripeljala vojsko na Sicilijo, vendar bi to bili edini dve fronti, z izjemo Kartažansko povezanih Makedoncev na vzhodu.

S tako dvema frontoma vojne in Kartažani že blizu vojne izčrpanosti je nemogoče videti veliko na poti do kartažanske zmage, tudi z več neverjetnimi zmagami Hanibala. Edini pravi rezultat bi bili boljši mirovni pogoji za Kartagino.

Bitka pri Cannaeju in druge Hanibalove bitke so po Italiji razširile toliko strahu, da se je Rim neizogibno počutil udobno, medtem ko je obstajala Kartagina. Tretja vojna bi se zgodila ne glede na spremenjene mirovne pogoje.

Glede na ta izid bi skoraj zagotovo prišlo do tretje vojne, kakršna je bila v zgodovini. Tretja vojna se je zgodila več kot petdeset let po drugi –, sproženi zaradi dolgotrajnih strahov pred Kartagino. Čeprav je bila Kartagina senca nekdanjega jaza, je vsak govor Katona starejšega zahteval njegovo uničenje. Tretja vojna je bila v bistvu nič izzvana, bila je eno samo obleganje in nato uničenje mesta.

Tudi če bi bili mirovni pogoji po drugi vojni veliko boljši, bi Rim še vedno trdno držal svojo pomorsko premoč. Če bi Kartažani uspeli vrniti Španijo, bi se tam morda borili, a brez Hanibala bi jih preplavilo rimsko število. S skupnimi močmi bi potem zlahka oblegali in nato uničili tudi Kartagino.

Čudno je misliti, da Scipionova največja zmaga morda ne bi preveč spremenila zgodovine, a ker se je to res zgodilo, lahko na to gledamo drugače. Zmaga Rima pri Zami je zatrla vsako upanje na ugoden mir, sovraštvo med Rimom in Kartagino pa je zagotovilo, da bo na koncu prišla še ena vojna. Zama je Rimljanom le olajšal zmago v tretji punski vojni in uničil Kartagino.


Ta teden v zgodovini: Scipio premaga Hannibala pri Zami

19. oktobra 202 pr. N. Št. So po mnenju zgodovinarjev (čeprav nekje datum stoji septembra) rimski general Scipio Africanus v bitki pri Zami razbil sile Hanibala Barca iz Kartagine. Poraz je prisilil Kartažane, da so zmago v vojni prepustili Rimu.

Do sredine tretjega stoletja pred našim štetjem sta bili dve največji sili v zahodnem Sredozemskem morju Rim in Kartagina. Rimska republika je pretežno kopenska sila, obsegala pa je velik del italijanskega polotoka, v posesti Kartagine pa so bili različni otoki, velik del zahodne severne Afrike in celo deli Španije. Različne težave so povzročile vrsto vojn, znanih kot punske vojne, ki so se začele leta 264 pr. (latinska beseda "punski" je pomenila "feničansko", etnično pripadnost Kartažanov).

Prva punska vojna je trajala od 264 do 241 pr. in videli Sicilijo in severno Afriko kot glavno bojišče, vendar je vojna na morju prevladovala v spopadu. Vojna se je končala z rimsko zmago in republika, ki je zdaj v popolni lasti Sicilije, ki je stala na pol poti med Rimom in Kartagino in sta se obe strani bali, da bi lahko bil bodalo, usmerjeno v osrčje druge. Morda je še pomembneje, da je vojna prisilila Rim, da zgradi ogromno floto in se je prvič znašla v vlogi pomorske sile.

Eden od glavnih generalov v Kartagini v vojni je bil Hamilcar Barca, ki je tako sovražil Rimljane, da naj bi svojega mladeniča Hanibala prisegel, da bo sovražil tudi Rimljane, in se jim maščeval za poraz Kartagine.

Leta 218 pr.n.št. so se napetosti med Rimom in Kartagino spet razplamtele, tokrat predvsem zaradi vpliva vsake države v Španiji, bogati z viri. Po izbruhu vojne je Hanibal svojo vojsko, ki je vključevala več deset vojnih slonov, odpeljal čez Pireneje, čez današnjo južno Francijo in nazadnje čez Alpe. Rimski senat je poslal vojsko, da ustavi Hanibalov vdor s severa, vendar brez uspeha. Njegovi močni vojni sloni niso bili podobni Rimljanom, njihova vojska pa je pobegnila pred napadom velikih zveri.

V bitki za bitko so rimske sile utrpele poraz: Trebia, Trasimene, Cannae. Po Cannaeju, v katerem so bili Rimljani premagani z manevrom z dvojno ovojnico (ali kleščami), kartažanska vojska ni nadaljevala napada na samo mesto Rim. Po besedah ​​rimskega zgodovinarja Livija je eden od Hanibalovih častnikov Maharbal generalu rekel: "Ti veš, kako zmagati v bitki, Hanibal, ne pa, kako uporabiti svojo zmago."

Čeprav so se Kartažani v hudi bitki izkazali za hude borce, jim je primanjkovalo sredstev za ustrezno obleganje velikega rimskega mesta. Namesto da bi vse tvegal s poskusom zavzetja Rima, je Hanibal 14 let korakal po italijanskem polotoku navzgor in navzdol, napadal in premagal rimske vojske, poslane, da bi ga ustavile in oropale podeželje, vendar je na splošno malo vplival na strateške sposobnosti njegov sovražnik.

Kljub temu je to predstavljalo veliko krizo za Rimljane. Sovražna, nepremagljiva vojska je po svoji volji romala po njihovem ozemlju, kar je povzročilo vse vrste zmede in kaosa. Zagotovo so bila njihova mesta ogrožena, če jih niso napadli neposredno. Rimski položaj bi lahko primerjali z britanskim v letih 1940-1941, ko nacistična nemška grožnja ni mogla neposredno prevzeti britanskih otokov, čeprav bi lahko sovražniku povzročala vse vrste glavobolov in težav.

Po letih neuspešnih vojn v Italiji (in še nekaj drugih gledališčih) so se Rimljani odločili za drzno novo strategijo. Namesto da se preprosto borite proti Kartažanom v Italiji, Španiji in na Siciliji, zakaj ne bi poslali ekspedicije v severno Afriko, da bi neposredno ogrozili Kartagino? Leta 205 pr.n.št.je bil za konzula postavljen Publius Cornelius Scipio, nekakšen sopredsednik z drugim letno izvoljenim konzulom. Star je bil le 31 let. Naslednje leto je svoje čete iztovoril v severni Afriki.

Zgodovinar Joseph Cummins je v knjigi »Največje vojne v zgodovini: epski konflikti, ki so oblikovali sodobni svet« zapisal: »Scipionove sile so opustošile velik del bogate doline Bagradas in pozno poleti 204 uspešno oblegale Utiko. Scipion je pri tem pomagal, saj so imeli vsi pomembni zavezniki Kartažanov, Numidijani, novega vodjo po imenu Masinissa, ki je svojo zvestobo preusmeril v Rim in s seboj pripeljal svoje precejšnje sile.

Cummins ugotavlja tudi, da so na oblast v Kartagini prišle nove frakcije, ki so bile sovražne Hannibalovi družini. Čeprav so se mirovna pogajanja začela, so se kmalu zlomila in Scipio je še naprej divjal po severni Afriki. Poleti 202 se je Hannibal končno strinjal, da zapusti Italijo in pomaga pri obrambi Kartagine.

Ko so 19. oktobra 202 pr. N. Št. Ali okoli njega Scipionove sile končno srečale Hanibalove veterane v kraju, ki bi se na koncu imenoval Zama v zahodni Tuniziji (natančna lokacija bitke ni povsem gotova), so se Rimljani ponašali z 29.000 pehotami in 6.000 konjeniki. Kartažane je sestavljalo 36.000 pešcev in 4.000 konjenikov. In seveda je imel Hanibal svoje najljubše orožje, neznano število vojnih slonov. Obe strani sta svojo pehoto na sredino strnili, njihova konjenica pa je držala obe boki. Hanibalovi sloni so stali pred njegovo pehoto.

Predictably, Hannibal opened his assault with a charge of his elephants. Scipio had prepared for this tactic and trained his troops to open alleyways between infantry formations, then guide the elephants into the alleyways with spears. Also, Scipio ordered his horns to sound just as the elephants were charging to disorient and frighten them. The tactic worked, and the elephants all funneled through the alleyways between infantry formations and then kept running once through — the dreaded war elephants had been neutralized.

Scipio took advantage of his stunned enemy, who had just seen a tried and true tactic fail, to launch an assault with his cavalry from both flanks. With superior numbers, the Roman cavalry hit their Carthaginian opposite numbers hard, and the Carthaginian horsemen soon fled with their foes in hot on pursuit.

The opening moves of the battle had not gone as Hannibal had planned, but he was undeterred. He began extending his infantry lines just as the Romans did the same. Hannibal's veterans — perhaps the best infantry in the world at the time, held the center of his line, while mercenary and secondary infantry forces fanned out to cover the flanks. The two lines of infantry crashed into one another, and the fighting began in earnest. It was still anybody's ball game.

Then, unexpectedly, the Roman cavalry returned. It had broken off its pursuit of the Carthaginian horsemen and now crashed into the rear column of the Carthaginian footmen. The shock of the powerful Roman cavalry at their back broke the Carthaginian line, sending the infantry running in all directions. Scipio had won the day.

With the loss of the battle and Hannibal's army, the Carthaginians now had no realistic way of winning the war militarily and soon called for another round of peace talks. This time, they bore fruit. In the book, “The Romans: From Village to Empire: A History of Ancient Rome from Earliest Times to Constantine,” historians Mary T. Boatwright, Daniel J. Gargola, and Richard J.A. Talbert wrote:

“Peace was concluded in 201. The terms of the treaty severely restricted Carthaginian power and blocked any prospect of its revival. The Carthaginians surrendered their fleet, were burdened with crippling indemnity payments, lost all their territory outside of the core around Carthage and the other Punic cities in northern Tunisia, and were prohibited from waging war outside this territory without Roman permission. Meantime, Masinissa emerged as a staunch Roman ally with control of an enlarged Numidian kingdom.”


How Could Hannibal Have Won?

Hannibal had no way of knowing Rome would be so determined, he was probably taken back by the response to Cannae, though he certainly had a good plan regardless. Capturing Rome was probably not his objective upon invading. Carthage had Italy on their mind and raised substantial forces to support him. Hannibal himself urged Carthage to send a 25000 strong force to Sicily rather than himself in Italy, which they did. Further forces meant to support him were diverted as they lost armies in other theaters, armies which were also ordered to march to Italy but were defeated before even leaving Iberia. So yes, other theaters do matter. This would have essentially allowed four armies operating in Italy after Cannae, which surely would have changed Romes response and that of her allies.


Hannibal had a lot of support in Carthage, aided by the riches of Spain, popular support and popular politics, and perhaps fear. The excellent Punic scholar Dexter Hoyos believes he was actually defacto in charge of Carthage during 2 war (not something I agree with but the evidence can be read like that) in his book Hannibal's Dynastyower and politics in the western Mediterranean 247-183 BC.

My understanding was that after Cannae Hannibal was refused reinforcements. He also received no siege equipment from Carthage. Surely a general of Hannibal's ability would have wanted the opportunity to take Rome itself?

I am referring to the first Punic War, unless you are referring to later ones? Certainly initially Hannibal wasn't particularly liked by those in charge back home, and it was only due to his popularity with the masses and his amazing victories that they felt they had to give him at least minimal support.

Put it this way, as soon as the Romans started to get they upper hand, they immediately laid siege to Hannibal.

Pyrrhos The Eagle

Hannibal was not refused reinforcements and he did have siege equipment. Circumstances prevented him from getting some of these reinforcements.

Why is it certain that Hannibal wasn't intially liked by those in charge back home? This is a view which probably does Carthage some disservice. It had the chance to at least distance itself from the Romans prior to the war, but refused to do this. I believe too much is made of Carthage not being on Hannibal's side. No doubt the Carthaginian government would have loved to recover the territory and prestige lost in the first war.

Consider what Polybius says of this, "Fabius, the Roman annalist, says that besides the outrage on the Saguntines, a cause of the war was Hasdrubal's ambition and love of power. He tells us how, having acquired a great dominion in Spain, he arrived in Africa and attempted to abolish the constitution of Carthage and change the form of government to a monarchy. The leading statesmen, however, got wind of his project and united to oppose him, upon which Hasdrubal, suspicious of their intentions, left Africa and in future governed Iberia as he chose, without paying any attention to the Carthaginian Senate. Hannibal from boyhood had shared and admired Hasdrubal's principles and on succeeding to the governor-generalship of Iberia, he had employed the same method as Hasdrubal. Consequently, he now began this war against Rome on his own initiative and in defiance of Carthaginian opinion, not a single one of the notables in Carthage approving his conduct towards Saguntum. After telling us this, Fabius says that on the capture of this city the Romans came forward demanding that the Carthaginians should either deliver Hannibal into their hands or accept war. Now if anyone were to pose the following question to this writer — how opportunity could have better favoured the Carthaginians' wishes or what could have been a juster act and more in their interest (since, as he says, they had disapproved Hannibal's action from the outset) than to yield to the Roman demand, and by giving up the man who had caused the offence, with some show of reason to destroy by the hands of others the common enemy of their state and secure the safety of their territory, ridding themselves of the war that menaced them and accomplishing their vengeance by a simple resolution — if anyone, I say, were to ask him this, what would he have to say? Evidently nothing for so far were they from doing any of the above things that after carrying on the war, in obedience to Hannibal's decision, for seventeen years, they did not abandon the struggle, until finally, every resource on which they relied being now exhausted, their native city and her inhabitants stood in deadly peril" (3.8.1-11)


Vsebina

The most distinct feature of the Carthaginian army was its composition. Contrary to most other states in the Mediterranean at the time, the army was composed almost exclusively of foreign mercenary units while its navy was manned by citizens. Carthage lacked a history of citizen infantry forces, requiring its army to be composed mainly of foreign troops, particularly Libyans, Numidians, Iberians, Gauls, and Greeks. Its Phoenician origins, however, granted Carthage a long history as a seafaring people. Additionally, while the navy was a permanently manned force, the army would be enlisted only for a particular campaign and then demobilized. Only when the city of Carthage itself was threatened would citizens be conscripted into infantry service. [2]

Ancient authors, such as Polybius and Livy, tend to stress Carthage's reliance on mercenary units. The term "mercenary", however, is misleading when applied to the entire Carthaginian army. As often the wealthiest polity in the region, Carthage could and regularly did employ large numbers of mercenaries in the true sense of the term. However, many of their African and Iberian recruits were not true mercenaries as these peoples often came from states or territories subject to or allied with Carthage, who were bound by treaty to supply Carthage's army with soldiers furnished from their own ranks. [3] For example, the Carthaginian cavalry was predominantly provided by their Numidian allies, a people famous for their elite light cavalry units. In the aftermath of the First Punic War, Carthage was on the brink of bankruptcy and found itself unable to pay what they owed the true mercenaries who had served them in the war. This led to the Mercenary War with Carthage’s domestic forces and some of her remaining allies, forced to put down a rebellion by the unpaid mercenaries. Afterwards, Carthage continued to fill it’s ranks with foreign conscripts, but never depended on hired mercenaries in the same way again. [4]

Establishment under Mago Edit

In 550 BC, Mago I of Carthage became king of Carthage and sought to establish Carthage as the dominant military power in the western Mediterranean. Though still economically dependent on its mother city of Tyre, Carthage was growing in stature. Under Mago, Carthage allied with the Etruscans of northern Italy against the Greek city-states in southern Italy, an alliance that would last until Rome expelled its Etruscan kings.

Mago also set about a series of military reforms designed to strengthen Carthaginian power. [5]

During the 4th century BC, the maximum number of standing troops Carthage expected at its service can be estimated from the capacity of the barracks located in the three rings of walls that protected the city, offering accommodation to 24,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, and 300 elephants. In addition to their own conscripted forces, large contingents of mercenaries and auxiliaries would be employed. Appian mentions that in total 40,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, and 2,000 heavy chariots were recruited to oppose the invasion of Agathocles of Syracuse. [6]

Growth of Mercenary Forces Edit

After the Punic defeats during the Sicilian Wars of the 5th and 4th centuries BC, in which large numbers of Carthaginian citizens had been killed, the Carthaginian Senate set about enlisting mercenary forces in order to replenish the ranks of the Carthaginian army, an extraordinary technique that Carthage had employed since the late 6th century BC. Beginning with the reign of King Hanno the Navigator in 480 BC, Carthage regularly began employing Iberian infantry and Balearic slingers to support Carthaginian spearmen in Sicily. [7]

Punic recruiters toured all corners of the Mediterranean, attracting mercenaries and fugitive slaves. Gauls, Ligurians, Numidians, Libyans, Greeks, and especially Iberians. were extensively recruited by Carthage. Troops were recruited both by simple monetary contracts and through partnerships established through treaties with other states and tribes. [8]

Reforms of Xanthippus Edit

In 256 BC, during the First Punic War with the Roman Republic, the Roman Consul Marcus Atilius Regulus decisively defeated the Carthaginian navy at the Battle of Cape Ecnomus, enabling him to land a Roman army in Africa. Prior to this point in the war, most ground fighting had been on Sicily, now the Roman armies threatened Carthage itself. After landing, Regulus' army immediately began scorched earth campaign, pillaging the Punic countryside and following a brief siege, sacking the city of Aspis. [9] Regulus then inflicted a crushing defeat on a hastily raised Carthaginian army at the Battle of Adys near Carthage.

Following these events, Carthage sued for peace, but the terms demanded by Regulus were too harsh, and the war continued. The Carthaginians began to quickly expand their military capabilities on land, conscripting their own citizens and recruiting more mercenaries, including Spartan captain Xanthippus, who was charged with retraining and restructuring the Carthaginian army. Xanthippus adopted the combined arms model of the Macedonian army, developed during the time of Phillip II. Xanthippus split his cavalry between his two wings, with mercenary infantry screening the cavalry, and a hastily raised citizen phalanx in the center screened by a line of elephants in front of the spearmen. Previously, Carthaginian generals had placed the elephants behind the central phalanx. Xanthippus also realized the mistakes that the Carthaginians were making by avoiding open ground battles against the Romans, instead seeking only uneven terrain. This was done out of fear of the Romans' superior infantry. Such a strategy, however, restricted Carthage's strongest elements: its cavalry and elephants. Uneven terrain also disrupts the phalanx in favor of the more flexible legion. By seeking battles on open plains, Xanthippus was able to make the fullest use of Carthage's strengths, where Roman formations broke under attack from the elephant and cavalry charges. [10]

Under the leadership of Xanthippus, the reformed Carthaginian army completely destroyed the Roman army at the Battle of Bagradas River in 255 BC, capturing Regulus in the process and ending the Roman threat in Africa for the time being. [11]

Hamilcar Barca Edit

In 247 BC, after eighteen years of fighting in the First Punic War, the Carthaginian Senate appointed Hamilcar Barca to assume command of Carthage's land and naval forces in the struggle against the Roman Republic. Though Carthage dominated the sea following its victory in the Battle of Drepanum in 249 BC, Rome controlled most of Sicily. [12] Until this point, Carthage had been led by the landed aristocracy and they preferred to expand into Africa instead of pursuing an aggressive policy against Rome in Sicily. Hanno "The Great" [13] had been in charge of operations in Africa since 248 BC and had conquered considerable territory by 241 BC. [14]

Carthage at this time was feeling the strain of the prolonged conflict. In addition to maintaining a fleet and soldiers in Sicily, it was also fighting the Libyans and Numidians in Africa. [15] As a result, Hamilcar was given a fairly small army and the Carthaginian fleet was gradually withdrawn so that, by 242 BC, Carthage had no ships to speak of in Sicily. [16]

Infantry Edit

Though native carthaginian hoplite infantry could be fielded and was, it had been largely replaced by allied and mercenary infantry by the time of the first Punic war. Carthaginian infantry was made up of Libyans armed with one or two short spears that could be thrown, linothorax armor, bronze helmets, iberian style swords, and an aspis shield that was later replaced by a flat, oval shield gripped in the center. It was called a scutum in the western mediterranean and a thureos in the east. The shield change probably came as a result of prolonged experience with the more flexible Gallic, Ligurian, Italian, and Iberian mercenaries that had been using such shields for centuries prior.

Iberian warriors serving Carthage were split into scutari heavy infantry and caetrati light infantry, named so after their shields, the Caetra being a round buckler. They also wielded all iron soliferra javelins and falcata swords. Gallic and Ligurian footmen were armed with similar tall shields, chain mail, and bronze helmets, but carried heavier spears and longer, straighter swords.

Sacred Band Edit

The Sacred Band was an elite unit of the Carthaginian army. Since its formation in the 4th century BC, the unit consisted exclusively of the sons of the noble Carthaginian citizens. The unit usually did not fight outside of Africa. [17] As a unit of heavy spearmen, the unit was placed in the center of the army formation immediately behind the row of elephants and protected by auxiliary wings of mercenaries and cavalry.

The presence of Carthaginian citizens fighting as infantry in the army is unusual as Carthaginian citizens usually served only as officers or cavalry, while the bulk of Carthage's infantry units were generally made up of mercenaries, auxiliaries from allied communities (who might be Punic colonists), and conscripts from subject territories.

With their elite status, members of the Sacred Band received the best equipment in the Carthaginian army. Their weapons and training were similar to those of the Greek hoplites: heavy spear, sword, hoplon shield, and bronze greaves, helmet, and breastplate. The hoplites also fought in a phalanx formation. The unit numbered around 2,500 soldiers according to Diodorus. [18]

According to the historian A. Heuss:

"The central problem concerning Carthaginian political institutions is their relation to military aspects." ("Das zentrale Problem des karthagischen Staatslebens ist sein Verhältnis zum Militärwesen.") [19]

It has traditionally been argued that Carthage was a peaceful city of merchants or a brutal colonial power and both theories were rather dependent on modern perceptions. [20] Almost all approaches towards Carthage have in common the fact that they do not look at Carthaginian policy-making as such, but rather its structure in a fundamental contrast to that of Rome. [21] However, the polis Carthage was, over the course of several centuries, the dominant power in the Western Mediterranean and could establish its symmachy over large territories, which were also deeply influenced by the Punic culture. It played a very important role in the urbanization of Northern Africa, where the Punic language was to persist until the 5th century AD. [22]

The idea that mercantile business and warlike spirit are contradictory dates to the Age of Enlightenment [23] and is generally not shared by ancient sources, such as Virgil, who writes in Eneida 1,444f. on Carthage: for this reason shall the people be glorious in war and acquire food easily for centuries (sic nam fore bello / egregiam et facilem victu per saecula gentem). Livy already points out that Carthage did house a body of at least 40,000 professional soldiers until sometime after the Second Punic War. Other sources can be interpreted to refer to a high degree of military professionalism in the small Punic population whose constitution Aristotle groups along with those of Sparta and Crete. So there is an ongoing debate among historians about the extent of Carthage's military spirit. [23] It should be pointed out that the sources on the Punic forces are rare and not easily accessible because they are almost exclusively written by their opponents in war. [24] An inscription discovered in Carthage seems to confirm the doubts raised by the lack of sources concerning members of the nobility in the trading business. The translation (which is, like all translations from the Punic, disputed in details) only mentions in the existing parts merchants among the people with little money, while owners of producing facilities are mentioned among those with more money. [1]

Similar doubts were raised earlier because our only source on a Punic trader is the play Poenulus and the Carthaginian presented there is a rather humble merchant. An important part of the Punic culture seems to have consisted in their devotion to the gods, and their well-known units, called Sacred Bands by our Greek sources [ specify ] , are regarded as the elite troops of their time. These consisted of infantry troops and cavalry units. The latter were formed by young nobles of the city devoting their life to military training. [ potreben citat ]

Ancient authors, such as Polybius, tend to stress Carthage's reliance on foreign mercenaries. [25] However, the term 'mercenary' is misleading when applied to the North African and Iberian recruits, i.e. from areas controlled by Carthage. They were comparable to Roman Auxilia though Carthage did also employ mercenaries in the true sense as well. [26]

Units were generally segregated by ethnicity, which was also a criterion for the respective specialisation. While within a unit communication in the native tongue was possible, between units Greek and Punic helped to establish communication. According to Polybius, this enabled the insurgents during the Mercenary War, which is also the only recorded large mutiny of Carthage's troops, to communicate with each other on higher levels. [27] [28]

The reported causes for this conflict were that following the First Punic War against Rome, payment of the mercenaries was delayed for over a year. When finally arrangements for payment were made, the mistrust between the mercenaries and their employer helped to kindle the war. The native North African Libyans, the largest contingent of the 'mercenaries', objected to being paid last while their comrades had been shipped home. Fear had spread that this might be a Carthaginian trap to exterminate them without payment and save their silver, after having crippled their army of the specialized supportive arms units. The conditions for the payment were rejected, although their former commander, Gisco, had provided them with his own person and 500 other nobles as hostages to reassure them of Carthage's sincere and honest intentions. The mercenaries and supporting native insurgents began attacking Carthaginian targets and urging the Libyan natives to rise. According to our sources, the war was conducted in a particularly brutal fashion and ended, after three years, with the total destruction of the mercenary and insurgent forces. [29]

It would be difficult to say precisely what a typical make-up of a Carthaginian army would be, but in the Punic wars, they are reported to have included Greeks, Iberians, Balearics, Gauls, Ligures, Italians (e.g. Samnites, Lucanians), Sicilians, Numidians, Libyans, Lybo-Phoenicians (also called Africans), and Punics from Carthage and its allied or external settlements. Sources often broadly label recruits from the latter three groups as "Africans." [ potreben citat ]

Very few Punic records survived the Roman Era and scholars have limited knowledge of the Punic language. As a result, it is unclear exactly what specific title the Carthaginians bestowed on their military commanders as the few accurate Roman and Greek sources we do have often confuse Carthaginian offices. [30] Greek sources referred to the commander of Punic forces as a Strategos, a catch all Hellenic term meaning general or commander accordingly the term may also refer to a Carthaginian military governor and or an official authorized to sign treaties. [31] In areas of conflict, we often find dual command and not all Carthaginian strategoi seem to be concerned with governing provinces. According to Roman sources, the Carthaginian office of Boetharch may have been linked closely with military command.

While both states were fundamentally governed by an elected body of noble citizens or "Senate" one major systemic difference between the Roman Republic and the Carthaginian oligarchy was that their chief executives did not by virtue of office hold any direct authority over the military. Carthage's nobles could afford, and were legally allowed, to sustain their own armies. This practice was established by Hamilcar Barca following the Mercenary War. The change in practice ensured that specific wealthy Carthaginians were now responsible for paying mercenaries, not the state. Furthermore, we tend to find evidence that many individuals from the leading families of Carthage served in the military forces. [32]

Notably the hired units were deployed with their own command structure. As Carthage sent out specific recruiters who bargained contracts with each soldier/corps of soldiers, it is possible that these also served as officers responsible for the integration of their units into the army. Polybius noted for the mercenary war that the mercenaries were told to ask their commanding officers for payment, which frustrated them to such an extent that they elected new ones. In the army, payment was done per unit with subordinates responsible for the further distribution.

The Libyans supplied both heavy and light infantry and formed the most disciplined units of the army. The heavy infantry fought in close formation, armed with long spears and round shields, wearing helmets and linen cuirasses. The light Libyan infantry carried javelins and a small shield, the same as Iberian light infantry. The Iberian infantry wore purple bordered white tunics and leather headgear. [33] The Iberian heavy infantry fought in a dense phalanx, armed with broad headed spears called lonche that could be thrown, long body shields and short slashing swords called "falcata". [34] Campanian, Sardinian and Gallic infantry fought in their native gear, [35] but were often equipped by Carthage. Polybius does not suggest that Hannibal's heavy Libyan infantry was equipped with the sarissa (pike), but a number of translations turned the Greek longche for javelin into pike by the wrong assertion that it means lance (lancea was originally a throwing weapon). There is a mention of a 5,000 men contingent on Zama fighting in Macedonian fashion, sent by the Macedonian king. It is not clear what that exactly means. It could be a Macedonian-style phalanx or some troops using long two handed naval lances, a practice quite common among marines at that age and according to Plutarch also successfully employed by the Romans. [36] The claim of sarissa armed Carthaginian infantry is naturally disputed by experts capable of reading the Greek original, and Polybius himself is not clear, when he mentions Hannibal next to Pyrrhus in his famed comparison between the Roman manipular system and the Macedonian system. [37] It is not clear what the Macedonian system constitutes, pike blocks or combined arms tactics, although the variant of the Hellenistic empires was heavily reliant on their exclusive ethnic group forming the pike blocks, with others serving as numerous less relevant skirmishers. At that time, most Greek states fought with thureophoroi called scutarii by the Romans and it required wealth and manpower to field a pike-armed phalanx.

The Libyans, Carthaginian citizens and the Libyo-Phoenicians provided disciplined, well trained cavalry equipped with thrusting spears and aspis shields that were later replaced by a flat oval shield called the thyreos. Numidia provided superb light cavalry, highly skilled in skirmishing tactics, armed with bundles of javelins, a small round shield and riding without bridle or saddle. Iberians and Gauls also provided cavalry that relied on the all out charge. The Libyans provided the bulk of the heavy, four horse war chariots for Carthage, used before the Second Punic War. [38] Allied cities of the Punic hegemony also contributed contingents for the army. The Carthaginian officer corps held overall command of the army, although many units may have fought under their chieftains.

Carthaginian forces also employed war-elephants, both within Africa and during overseas operations, including campaigns in Iberia and most famously Hannibal's invasion of Italy. These beasts were the now-extinct North African elephant (Loxodonta [africana] pharaoensis), probably a subspecies of the African forest elephant (Loxodonta cyclotis), which is smaller than the African bush elephant (Loxodonta africana) and the Indian elephants (elephas maximus) used by the Seleucids. In battle, the elephants functioned as a psychological weapon, frightening the opposing men and horses into flight or creating gaps in the enemy line that could be exploited by Carthaginian cavalry and infantry. [39] Modern scholars have disputed whether or not Carthaginian elephants were furnished with turrets in combat despite frequent assertions to the contrary, the evidence indicates that African forest elephants could and did carry turrets in certain military contexts. [40]

Polybius wrote in the sixth book of his History that the Carthaginians were, "more exercised in maritime affairs than any other people". [41] The Romans, unable to defeat them through conventional maritime tactics, developed the Corvus, or the crow, a spiked boarding bridge that could be impaled onto an enemy ship so that the Romans could send over marines to capture or sink the Carthaginian vessels. [ potreben citat ]

Recruitment Edit

The sailors and marines of the fleets were recruited from the lower classes of Carthage itself, meaning that the navy was manned in the majority by actual Carthaginian citizens, in contrast to the largely mercenary army. The navy offered a stable profession and financial security for its sailors. This helped to contribute to the city's political stability, since the unemployed, debt-ridden poor in other cities were frequently inclined to support revolutionary leaders in the hope of improving their own lot. [42]

    , about 600 BC – 265 BC:
    • First Sicilian War, 480 BC
    • Second Sicilian War, 410 BC – 340 BC
    • Third Sicilian War, 315 BC – 307 BC

    In the Numidian War (114 BC – 104 BC) Punics and bearers of Punic names were among the Roman enemies. [43]

    1. ^ Lanning, Michael Lee, “The Military 100: A Ranking of the Most Influential Leaders of All Time”. Citadel Press (October 1, 2002).
    2. ^ Goldsworthy, Adrian (March 2008). The Fall of Carthage: The Punic Wars 265-146BC. str. 32.
    3. ^ Pyrrhus of Epirus by Jeff Champion, p 107
    4. ^ Emery, Kevin Patrick, "Carthaginian Mercenaries: Soldiers of Fortune, Allied Conscripts, and Multi-Ethnic Armies in Antiquity" (2016) digitalcommons.wofford.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1010&context=studentpubs. Pages 58-64.
    5. ^Justin, 19, 1.1
    6. ^Appian, The Foreign Wars: The Punic Wars, 80
    7. ^ Emery, 20-21
    8. ^ Pyrrhus of Epirus by Jeff Champion, p 107
    9. ^ James Hampton, ed. (1823). "The General History of Polybius - Chapter III". The General History of Polybius. I (5th ed.). London: W. Baxter. str. 35. Retrieved December 14, 2008.
    10. ^ Emery, 35-38.
    11. ^ Polybius, Zgodovine, Book I.
    12. ^ Rankov, Boris (2011). "A War of Phases: Strategies and Stalemates". In Hoyos, Dexter (ed.). A Companion to the Punic Wars. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 151. 978-1-4051-7600-2.
    13. ^ Appian Hispania 4
    14. ^ Diodorus Siculus 24.10, Polybius 1.73.1, 1.72.3
    15. ^ Bagnall, Nigel, The Punic Wars, p 92-94 0-312-34214-4
    16. ^ Polybius 1.59.9
    17. ^ Polybius, Zgodovine, Book I, Chapter 33.5-7
    18. ^ Diodorus, Zgodovinska knjižnica xvi.80.4-5.
    19. ^ Ameling, Walter Karthago: Studien zu Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft str. 7, quoting A. Heuss Die Gestaltung des römischen und karthagischen Staates bis zum Pyrrhuskrieg in: RuK, p. 114
    20. ^ Ameling, 2
    21. ^ Ameling, 3
    22. ^ Ameling, 2f
    23. ^ ab Ameling, 7
    24. ^ Ameling, Walter Karthago: Studien zu Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft3-406-37490-5
    25. ^ Polybius, Book 6, 52. On The Perseus Project

    The former (the Romans - editor's note) bestow their whole attention upon this department (upon military service on land - editor's note): whereas the Carthaginians wholly neglect their infantry, though they do take some slight interest in the cavalry. The reason of this is that they employ foreign mercenaries, the Romans native and citizen levies. It is in this point that the latter polity is preferable to the former. They have their hopes of freedom ever resting on the courage of mercenary troops: the Romans on the valour of their own citizens and the aid of their allies.


    3. He Had To Abandon The Campaign Because Rome Attacked Carthage

    Bust of Scipio Africanus, by Chiurazzi and De Angelis Foundry, 19th Century, via Art Institute Chicago

    Rome decided that the best way to deal with Hannibal was to attack Carthage itself. Hannibal had feared such a move and was losing ground in Italy. In Spain, a young Roman general called Scipio Africanus won a series of battles. He reclaimed the province for Rome in 205 BC, forcing the Carthaginians to retreat. The following year, Scipio sailed across the Mediterranean.

    Faced with an invasion, Hannibal was recalled to Carthage, and the two generals met in 202 BC at the Battle of Zama . Scipio had 30,000 troops and 5,500 cavalry and had studied Hannibal’s tactics. Hannibal arrived with around 47,000 men. He also tried to deploy a unit of war elephants, but the Carthaginians hadn’t had time to train them fully. Scipio’s men panicked the animals and forced them back towards Hannibal’s lines, where they went on a rampage.

    Crippled, Hannibal’s army was easy prey for a rear attack by the Roman cavalry, suffering around 20,000 losses. Hannibal agreed to terms, ending the Second Punic War. Carthage’s fleet was dismantled, and her coffers emptied once again by heavy Roman taxes. Spain remained in Roman hands. Rome had asserted itself as the dominant power in the Mediterranean.

    2. Hannibal Offered His Services To Rome’s Rivals

    Battle of Zama, part of the History of Scipio tapestry, after Giulio Romano, 17th Century, the Louvre

    After the defeat at Zama, Hannibal Barca retired from military service and instead became a magistrate. Ironically, he was charged with overseeing the payment of Carthage’s fines to Rome. Despite this, Hannibal enacted a series of reforms that allowed Carthage paid its debts quickly. These changes focused on eliminating corruption. But political opponents in the Senate saw their interests affected by these measures and sought to remove Hannibal.

    During the war, Hannibal had repeatedly petitioned the Carthaginian Senate for supplies and reinforcements. They had Senate refused, reluctant to spend more money on the war and wary of Roman reprisals. Instead, they insisted that Hannibal did not need help. Despite their backstabbing, Hannibal tried to serve as best he could, but his opponents began to claim that he was rebuilding Carthage’s power to challenge Rome again.

    Seeing that his countrymen had turned against him, Hannibal of Carthage escaped the city in 195 BC. He made for the Middle East, reaching the Seleucid court of King Antiochus III, one of Rome’s enemies. He was appointed as an advisor, but the Seleucids were initially wary of giving him military powers. When Rome defeated the Seleucids in 189 BC, Hannibal fled to avoid capture.


    Carthage Rises Again: The Third Punic War

    Although the peace terms dictated by Rome were meant to prevent another war with Carthage from ever occurring, one can only keep a defeated people down for so long.

    In 149 B.C., some 50 years after the Second Punic War, Carthage managed to build up another army that it then used so as to try and regain some of the power and influence it had once had in the region, before the rise of Rome.

    This conflict, known as the Third Punic War, was much shorter and ended once again in Carthaginian defeat, finally closing the book on Carthage as a real threat to Roman power in the region. Carthaginian territory was then turned into the province of Africa by the Roman. The Second Punic War brought about the downfall of the established balance of power of the ancient world and Rome rose to become the supreme power in the Mediterranean region for the coming 600 years.

    Second Punic War / Second Carthaginian War Timeline (218-201 BC):

    218 pr – Hannibal leaves Spain with an army to attack Rome.

    216 BC – Hannibal annihilates the Roman army at Cannae.

    215 BC –Syracuse breaks alliance with Rome.

    215 BC– Philip V of Macedonia allies himself with Hannibal.

    214-212 BC – Roman siege of Syracuse, involving Archimedes.

    202 pr – Scipio defeats Hannibal at Zama.

    201 BC – Carthage surrenders and Second Punic War comes to an end.